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Abstract: In this paper, we study the evolution of US divorce rates across states, 
from 1956 to 1998. By using a cluster algorithm, we identify different groups of 
states that converge (or diverge) with (or from) each other in the growth of their 
divorce rates. We find strong support for the club classification. For the overall 
1956–1998 period, we obtain evidence of divergence from the common growth 
component, but when we split the sample, a different pattern is observed. In the 
pre-unilateral divorce reform period (1956–1972), we find that most of the states 
had converging divorce rates within several convergence clubs, while in the 
post-reform period (1973–1998) an intense divergent process took place in 
divorce rates, across states, within different divergence clubs. 
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1. Introduction 
In an influential article, Friedberg (1998) analyzed the effect of the no-fault unilateral 
divorce laws of the 1970s on the evolution of the US divorce rate. Using a state-based 
panel of divorce data from 1968 to 1988, Friedberg found that the adoption of unilateral 
divorce laws had a permanent influence on divorces, accounting for almost one-sixth of 
the rise in the divorce rate since the late 1960s. Later, Wolfers (2006) replicated 
Friedberg’s exercise, extending the data period (from 1956 to 1998) and adding 
variables that explicitly model the dynamic response of divorce.  Wolfers’ results show 
that the no-fault unilateral divorce reforms had a positive effect on the divorce rate, but 
the effect was transitory; after a decade, no effect on the divorce rate could be 
discerned. These findings have been widely accepted, and the methodology has been 
used by others to analyze the dynamic response of divorce rates in other countries (for 
instance, González and Viitanen (2009) study the effect of divorce laws on a sample of 
European divorce rates).1 In this paper, we do not pretend to explore the transitory or 
permanent impact of divorce law reforms on divorce rates; rather, we examine whether 
the transition to more liberal divorce laws implied a convergence or divergence of 
divorce across US states’ divorce rates. 
The liberalization of divorce laws leads to a decrease in the costs associated with 
divorce, which can make divorce more feasible. From a theoretical point of view, the 
number of divorces, and thus the divorce rate, would increase, since a greater number of 
couples value the now less-expensive divorce over marriage, although, as Becker (1981) 
argued, divorce law reforms may not affect the probability of marriage breakdown, 
since they only affect property rights. Following the Coase Theorem, under mutual 
consent divorce, the party who wants to divorce has to compensate their spouse, in such 
a way that mutual consent gives considerable power to spouses who do not want a 
divorce. The change to a unilateral system transfers the right to divorce to the spouse 
most wanting a divorce. In this case, it is the party who wants to continue married who 
must compensate the spouse who wishes to leave. When the re-assignment of property 
rights between spouses is accompanied by transfers between them, a stable aggregate 
divorce rate should be observed, and then divorce convergence would be expected. 
                                                 
1 Of course, there are more determinants of divorce; e. g., child custody and child support laws 
(González-Val and Marcén, 2012), economic growth (South, 1985), price stability (Nunley, 2010), 
unemployment (Amato and Beattie, 2011), the birth-control pill (Marcén, 2014), and culture (Furtado et 
al., 2013). 
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Nonetheless, the aggregate divorce rate will change when compensation is not possible 
(see, for example, Allen, 2002) and so divorce convergence would not be possible 
across all US states. 
The study of the evolution of divorce rates is considered important in the 
literature since divorce has been suggested as having an impact on both women and 
children. The possibility of divorce may increase female labor force participation, 
(Michael, 1985; Johnson and Skinner, 1986; Peters, 1986; Parkman, 1992), but it can 
also affect the economic status of divorced women and their children (Jarvis and 
Jenkins, 1999; Bedard and Deschênes, 2005). Divorce may also have a negative effect 
on the psychological well-being of children (Seltzer, 1994; Amato, 2000; Gruber, 2004; 
Gähler and Palmtag, 2014). 
To analyze divorce convergence in the US, we utilize the Phillips and Sul (2007) 
panel convergence method on a sample of fifty US states and the District of Columbia, 
for the period 1956 to 1998. This methodology does not require any specific 
assumptions concerning the stationarity of the divorce rate, our variable of interest, 
and/or the existence of common factors. This cluster algorithm has been extensively 
used in the economic literature, for example, to explore convergence in the cost of 
living across US cities (Phillips and Sul, 2007), price convergence (Fischer, 2012), the 
historical population convergence of the US cities (González-Val and Lanaspa, 2014), 
the income convergence of member states of the European Union (Fritsche and Kuzin, 
2011; Bartkowska and Riedl, 2012) and even the happiness club convergence in Europe 
(Apergis and Georgellis, 2014), among others. We add to this literature by exploring 
whether divorce rates converge across US states. 
Our findings suggest that there was not a full convergence in divorce rates across 
the US. We do find empirical evidence of divergence clubs when we use the whole 
sample in the analysis, but, after dividing the sample into two periods, pre-reform 
(1956-1972) and post-reform (1973-1998), our results show that, in the pre-reform 
period, most of the states were converging in divorce rates while in the post-reform 
period, we find a divergent process in divorce rates across states within different 
divergence clubs. Then, even if the effects of divorce law reform disappear after a 
decade, as suggested by Wolfers (2006), these results would point to the reforms as a 
main determinant of the changes in the club classification, and of the change from 
convergence to divergence of divorce rates. 
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Section 2 presents the data used. In Section 3, we apply the cluster algorithm to 
identify different groups of states that converge with each other. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
We use the same dataset as Wolfers (2006), testing the dynamic response of the divorce 
rate to a change in the legal regime that governs divorce, using data on the states’ 
divorce rate between 1956 and 1998. The divorce rate ( DR ) is defined as the annual 
absolute number of divorces per thousand inhabitants in each state (the source is the 
Vital Statistics of the United States). 
This is known as the crude divorce rate and represents the standard measure of 
the level of, and changes in, divorce. Nevertheless, this rate could be affected by the 
marital status structure of the populations to it relates. Divorce rates may be low either 
because marriage rates are low, or because marriages are less likely to end in divorce. 
To examine this issue, we could have used another measure of divorce rates, defined as 
the annual number of divorces per 1000 married population, but this analysis would 
have been less reliable due to the scarcity of data on the total number of marriages, 
which is only available when each census is collected, normally every 10 years (see 
Furtado et al., 2013; Marcén, 2014). 
 Table 1 incorporates information on the year in which no-fault unilateral reforms 
were passed. Since 1968, 31 states introduced no-fault unilateral reforms, with most of 
those reforms taking place during the late 1960s and 1970s, with only two exceptions of 
reforms implemented in the 1980s, following Gruber’s (2004) classification. 
Unfortunately, information on the divorce rate is not available for all states during all 
the period considered (see Table 1). As we explain in detail below, for three states, 
(California, Indiana, and Louisiana) the analysis cannot be carried out because of data 
limitations. Table 1 also incorporates a summary of statistics of the divorce rates across 
states that points to a non-convergence in the evolution of the divorce rates at the state 
level during the period considered. There are important variations in the average divorce 
rates, with 15 states having an average divorce rate greater than 5 (the highest being 
Nevada, at 18.6), 27 states with an average divorce rate between 3 and 5, and 9 states 
with divorce rates lower than 3, (the lowest was 2.3, in the states of  Massachusetts and 
New York). It is not only that these differences in the divorce rates may reflect potential 
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divergences in divorce rate growth, but also the fact of considerable dissimilarities in 
the gap between the minimum and maximum divorce rates in each state. For example, 
in the case of New Mexico, we observe a minimum divorce rate of 1.5 and a maximum 
of 9.1, while in Pennsylvania the minimum was 1 and the maximum 3.5. 
3. Convergence clubs across states 
To explore the evolution of US divorce rates across states, we apply a cluster algorithm 
that allows us to identify different groups of states that converge (or diverge) with (or 
from) each other in the growth of their divorce rates. The cluster procedure is based on 
the log −t test (Phillips and Sul, 2007, 2009), which focuses on the evolution over time 
of idiosyncratic transitions in relation to the common growth component. Other papers 
have studied the evolution of divorce rates, focusing on the possible differences in 
idiosyncratic transitions across states relative to the common growth component, such 
as that of González-Val and Marcén (2012), where the path of the common growth 
component of state divorce rates is analyzed through panel unit root tests.2 This new 
approach is different from that of prior empirical studies of growth convergence clubs, 
such as the regression tree analysis used by Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and the 
predictive density of data used by Canova (2004) to identify different clusters of 
countries or regions. The procedure of Phillips and Sul focuses on divorce rate growth 
relative to the average rather than on individual state growth. Thus, their methodology 
enables us to identify the relative transitions that occur within subgroups, and to 
measure these transitions against the correlative of a common growth trend (Phillips and 
Sul, 2009). The regression model of the log −t test is 
( ) t
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 ( itDR  is the divorce rate of state i  at time t .). These relative 
                                                 
2 They find that the unit root null hypothesis cannot be rejected for most states, even when one or multiple 
structural breaks are allowed. 
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transition coefficients exclude the common growth component ( )tμ  by scaling, 
measuring state i ’s transition element relative to the cross-section average. This means 
that ith  traces out state i ’s individual trajectory relative to the average, so Phillips and 
Sul (2009) call ith  the ‘relative transition path.’ Moreover, ith  also measures for each 
state i  the departure from the common growth path tμ  in relative terms. 
Thus, Eq. (1) simply represents a time series regression; the null hypothesis is 
growth convergence across all states, and the alternatives include no convergence and 
partial convergence among subgroups of states. As the t-statistic of the test refers to the 
coefficient 1β  of the tlog  regressor in Eq. (1), the test is called the ‘ tlog ’ convergence 
test. It is important to note that not only the sign of the coefficient 1β  of tlog , but also 
its magnitude, measures the speed of convergence.  
The cluster procedure performs the tlog  test for each of the groups and stops 
when the group of remaining states does not satisfy the convergence test. First, it 
defines an initial core primary group, and other groups are then formed according to 
certain criteria that maximize the value of the t-statistic. A much more detailed 
explanation of the constructive steps of the procedure can be found in Phillips and Sul 
(2007, 2009). 
Figure 1 shows the path of all the states and demonstrates that it is not easy to 
infer any specific pattern. However, it seems clear that around the beginning of the 
1970s there is a rise in the trend of divorce rates in all the states, followed by a 
subsequent fall in the second half of the 1980s. Wolfers (2006) identified the 1969–
1977 period as the reform period, in which 28 states adopted unilateral divorce, but in 
most of these states the law changed in the first three years of the 1970s (see Table 1),3 
so the vertical red line indicates the intermediate year 1972.4 The fall in rates in the 
1980s, a decade later, coincides with the temporal duration of the effects of the 
unilateral reforms estimated by Wolfers (2006).5   
                                                 
3 González-Val and Marcén (2012) find that many of the structural breaks detected in the state series are 
located in that brief period (1970–1973). 
4 We have tried different intermediate years to split the sample and the qualitative results are maintained. 
5 Although González-Val and Marcén (2012) suggest that the long-run effect of divorce law reforms on 
the divorce rate observed by Wolfers (2006) may be the result of both unilateral reforms and changes in 
the aftermath of divorce. 
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Table 2 shows the results of applying the cluster algorithm to our sample of 
states.6 We consider three periods: 1956–1972 (pre-reform period), 1973–1998 (post-
reform period) and 1956–1998 as a whole. The “club” column shows the number of 
states that are members of each group. The distribution of states within groups can be 
found in Table 3. From 1956 to 1998, the algorithm classifies states into three groups, 
revealing three different steady divorce rates in the US. Three remaining states 
(California, Indiana, and Louisiana) are excluded because the algorithm requires a 
balanced panel dataset, and Wyoming is not classified into any club. In each group, the 
estimated coefficient 1βˆ  is significant, strongly supporting the club classification, 
although most of the states (35) are classified into the residual group 3. Furthermore, 
0ˆ1 <β  for the three groups, revealing evidence of divergence from the common growth 
component (divergence clubs). Figure 2 shows the path over time of the divorce rate of 
the states in each divergence club. 
The number of groups and their composition significantly changes if we split the 
sample into two periods. When we consider the pre-reform period (1956–1972) the 
cluster procedure identifies five groups. California, Indiana and Louisiana are excluded 
due to data limitations and Wyoming is not classified into any club, again. The 
coefficient 1βˆ  is significant for all groups, but 0ˆ1 >β  for groups 1, 2 and 4 (containing 
most of the states, 21, 14, and 4, respectively) and 0ˆ1 <β  for groups 3 and five (6 and 2 
states, respectively). Therefore, in this pre-reform period, most of the states, classified 
into three convergence clubs, were converging in divorce rates within each club; Figure 
3 displays the evolution of the divorce rates by club.  
However, when we focus on the post-reform period (1973–1998), we see a 
different picture. The algorithm classifies the states into six groups, and all of them are 
divergence clubs ( 0ˆ1 <β ). Two remaining states are not classified into any club 
(Nevada and Wyoming), and for these the convergence hypothesis is rejected; 
California, Indiana, and Louisiana are excluded because of missing data. Figure 4 shows 
the path over time of the divorce rate of the states by club. Again 1βˆ  is significant for 
all groups, but the estimated coefficients of the groups in this subperiod are greater than 
the coefficient of group 3 in the 1956–1998 period (-0.132) in which the majority of the 
                                                 
6 The estimations were performed with the Gauss code kindly provided by Donggyu Sul on his webpage. 
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states are classified. Thus, the divergent process in divorce rates across states observed 
from 1956 to 1998 was concentrated in the post-reform period. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this work, we examine the evolution of US divorce rates across states, using data for 
the period 1956-1998. We utilize a cluster algorithm that allows us to identify dissimilar 
convergent growth of divorce rates by state. The empirical evidence shows that, in the 
period considered, there was a clear divergence from the common growth component of 
the divorce rates across different clubs, but that this divergent process was especially 
intense in the post-reform period. In contrast, in the pre-reform period, we find that 
most of the states were converging in several convergence clubs.  
Our findings suggest that the liberalization of divorce laws does not imply a 
divorce convergence across the US. From the pre-reform period to the post-reform 
period, most of the states move from one club to another, and from convergent clubs to 
divergent clubs. Of course, this is a time series analysis, which does not allow us to 
infer any causal relationship. After a careful examination of the laws relating to divorce, 
we do not observe a clear pattern. States passing similar divorce law reforms are located 
in different clubs. Neither the marital regime, nor the reforms in the aftermath of 
divorce, following Gray’s (1998) classification and González-Val and Marcén (2012), 
are useful in explaining why some states are grouped with others. No geographical 
pattern can be deduced neither. However, our results indicate that there was an intense 
divergent process in divorce rates across states after divorce law reforms and a marked 
change from the patterns observed in previous decades, pointing to the important role of 
these reforms in the evolution of divorce rates. 
 
References 
[1] Allen, D. W., (2002). The impact of legal reforms on marriage and divorce, in The 
Law and Economics of Marriage & Divorce, A. W. Dnes and R. Rowthorn, (eds.), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
[2] Amato, P. R., (2000). The consequences of divorce for adults and children, 
Journal of Marriage and the Family, 62(4), 1269–1287. 
 8
[3] Amato, P. R., and B. Beattie, (2011). Does the unemployment rate affect the 
divorce rate? An analysis of state data 1960–2005. Social Science Research, 40: 
705–715. 
[4] Apergis, N. and Y. Georgellis, (2014). Does happiness Converge? Journal of 
Happiness Studies, DOI 10.1007/s10902-013-9495-y. 
[5] Bartkowska, M. and A. Riedls (2012). Regional convergence clubs in Europe: 
Identification and conditioning factors, Economic Modelling, 29(1), 22-31. 
[6] Becker, G., (1981). A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
[7] Bedard, K., and O. Deschênes, (2005). Sex preferences, marital dissolution, and 
the economic status of women, Journal of Human Resources, 40(2): 411–434. 
[8] Canova, F., (2004). Testing for convergence clubs in income per capita: a 
predictive density approach. International Economic Review, 45, 49–77. 
[9] Durlauf, S. N., and P. A. Johnson, (1995). Multiple regimes and cross-country 
growth behavior. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 10, 365–384. 
[10] Fischer, C. (2012). Price convergence in the EMU? Evidence from micro data. 
European Economic Review, 56(4), 757-776. 
[11] Friedberg, L., (1998). Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence 
from Panel Data. American Economic Review, 88(3), 608–627. 
[12] Fritsche, U. and V. Kuzin, (2011). Analysing convergence in Europe using the 
non-linear single factor model. Empirical Economics, 41 (2), 343-369. 
[13] Furtado, D., M. Marcen, and A. Sevilla-Sanz, (2013). Does Culture Affect 
Divorce? Evidence from European Immigrants in the US. Demography, 50(3), 
1013–1038. 
[14] Gähler, M. and E.L. Palmtag, (2014) parental Divorce, Psychological Well-Being 
and Educational Attainment: Changed Experience, Unchanged Effect Among 
Swedes Born 1892-1991, Social Indicators Research, forthcoming. 
 9
[15] González, L., and T. K. Viitanen, (2009). The Effect of Divorce Laws on Divorce 
Rates in Europe. European Economic Review, 53, 127–138. 
[16] González-Val, R., and L. Lanaspa, (2014). Patterns in U.S. Urban Growth (1790-
2000). Regional Studies, forthcoming. 
[17] González-Val, R., and M. Marcén, (2012). Unilateral divorce versus child custody 
and child support in the U.S. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
81(2), 613– 643. 
[18] Gray, J.S. (1998). Divorce-Law Changes, Household Bargaining, and Married 
Women’s Labor Supply. American Economic Review, 88 (3), 628-642. 
[19] Gruber, J., (2004). Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The Long-Run 
Implications of Unilateral Divorce. Journal of Labor Economics, 22(4), 799–833. 
[20] Jarvis, S., and S. P. Jenkins, (1999). Marital splits and income changes: Evidence 
from the British Household Panel Survey, Population Studies, 53: 237–254. 
[21] Michael, R. T., (1985). Consequences of the rise in female labor force 
participation rates: Questions and probes, Journal of Labor Economics, 3, s117–
s146. 
[22] Johnson, W. R., and J. Skinner, (1986). Labor supply and marital separation, 
American Economic Review, 76(3), 455–469. 
[23] Marcén, M., (2014). Divorce and the birth-control pill in the US, Feminist 
economics, forthcoming. 
[24] Nunley, J. M., (2010). Inflation and other aggregate determinants of the trend in 
US divorce rates since the 1960s. Applied Economics, 42(26), 3367–3381. 
[25] Parkman, A. M., (1992). Unilateral divorce and the labor-force participation rate 
of married women, revisited, American Economic Review, 82(3), 671–678. 
[26] Peters, H. E., (1986). Marriage and divorce: Informational constraints and private 
contracting, American Economic Review, 76(3), 437–454. 
[27] Peters, H. E., (1992). Marriage and divorce: Reply, American Economic Review, 
82(3), 687–693. 
[28] Phillips, P. C. B., and D. Sul, (2007). Transition Modeling and Econometric 
Convergence Tests. Econometrica, 75, 1771–1855. 
 10
[29] Phillips, P. C. B., and D. Sul, (2009). Economic Transition and Growth. Journal of 
Applied Econometrics, 24, 1153–1185. 
[30] Seltzer, J. A., (1994). Consequences of marital dissolution for children, Annual 
Review of. Sociology, 20, 235–266. 
[31] South, S. J., (1985). Economic conditions and the divorce rate: A time-series 
analysis of the postwar United States. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 47, 31–
41. 
[32] Wolfers, J., (2006). Did unilateral divorce laws raise divorce rates? A 
reconciliation and new results. American Economic Review, 96(5), 1802–1820. 
 11
Figure 1. States’ divorce rate paths, 1956–1998 
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Note: Nevada is not included because its extreme high divorce rate distorts the graph. 
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Figure 2. States’ convergence clubs, 1956–1998 
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Note: Nevada is not shown within Club 3 because its extremely high divorce rate distorts the 
graph. 
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Figure 3. States’ convergence clubs, 1956–1972 
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Figure 4. States’ convergence clubs, 1973–1998 
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Table 1. State divorce rates: Descriptive statistics 
 
State    Unilateral  Observations Average Max. Min.  State    Unilateral  Observations Average Max. Min. 
 Alabama   1971 1956–1998 5.4 6.9 3.2  Montana   1973 (1975) 1956–1998 4.6 6.5 2.7 
 Alaska   1935 1956–1998 5.8 9.0 2.4  Nebraska   1972 1956–1998 3.1 4.3 1.5 
 Arizona   1973 1956–1998 6.4 8.1 3.7  Nevada   1967 (1973) 1956–1998 18.6 36.6 8.1 
 Arkansas   . 1956–1998 5.7 8.0 2.8  New Hampshire  1971 1956–1998 4.0 5.9 1.7 
 California   1970 1956–1990 4.6 6.1 2.9  New Jersey   . 1956–1998 2.4 3.9 0.7 
 Colorado   1972 (1971) 1956–1998 5.0 7.6 2.7  New Mexico   1933 (1973) 1956–1998 5.6 9.1 1.5 
 Connecticut   1973 1956–1998 2.8 4.6 1.0  New York   . 1956–1998 2.3 3.8 0.4 
 Delaware   1968 (.) 1956–1998 3.6 5.5 1.2  North Carolina   . 1956–1998 3.6 5.3 1.2 
 District of Columbia  . 1956–1998 3.5 7.3 1.4  North Dakota   1971 1956–1998 2.5 3.6 0.8 
 Florida   1971 1956–1998 5.9 7.4 3.8  Ohio   . 1956–1998 4.0 5.5 2.2 
 Georgia   1973 1956–1998 4.6 6.4 2.1  Oklahoma   1953(.) 1956–1998 6.6 8.2 4.6 
 Hawaii   1972 (1973) 1956–1998 3.7 5.3 1.2  Oregon   1971 (1973) 1956–1998 5.0 6.8 3.0 
 Idaho   1971 1956–1998 5.5 7.0 3.6  Pennsylvania   . 1956–1998 2.5 3.5 1.0 
 Illinois   . 1956–1998 3.5 4.6 1.8  Rhode Island   1975 (1976) 1956–1998 2.6 3.8 1.0 
 Indiana   1973 1956–1990 5.1 7.6 1.7  South Carolina   . 1956–1998 3.0 4.6 1.0 
 Iowa   1970 1956–1998 3.1 4.4 1.5  South Dakota   1985 1956–1998 2.8 4.2 0.9 
 Kansas   1969 1956–1998 4.2 5.8 2.2  Tennessee   . 1956–1998 5.1 6.9 2.4 
 Kentucky   1972 1956–1998 4.1 6.4 2.1  Texas   1970 (1974) 1956–1998 5.1 6.9 3.6 
 Louisiana   . 1971–1983 3.4 4.3 2.5  Utah   1987 (.) 1956–1998 4.1 5.4 1.5 
 Maine   1973 1956–1998 4.0 5.6 2.0  Vermont   . 1956–1998 3.3 5.3 1.2 
 Maryland   . 1956–1998 3.0 4.1 1.7  Virginia   . 1956–1998 3.4 4.8 1.7 
 Massachusetts   1975 1956–1998 2.3 3.7 1.1  Washington   1973 1956–1998 5.3 7.3 3.2 
 Michigan   1972 1956–1998 3.7 4.9 1.8  West Virginia   . 1956–1998 4.0 5.6 1.8 
 Minnesota   1974 1956–1998 2.7 4.0 1.1  Wisconsin   1978 (.) 1956–1998 2.6 3.9 0.9 
 Mississippi   . 1956–1998 4.2 5.8 2.3  Wyoming   1977 1956–1998 6.1 8.5 3.6 
 Missouri   . 1956–1998 4.3 5.7 2.6             
 
Note: Year of unilateral divorce is from Gruber (2004) and from Friedberg (1998) in parentheses. 
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Table 2. State convergence clubs 
 
1956–1998  1956–1972 1973–1998 
Club 1βˆ  (t-statistic)  Club 1βˆ  (t-statistic) Club 1βˆ  (t-statistic) 
1 [5] -0.633 (-1.572)  1 [21] 0.223 (0.421) 1 [2] -1.099 (-0.601)
2 [7] -1.406 (-1.576)   2 [14] 0.324 (0.835) 2 [10] -1.037 (-1.099)
3 [35] -0.132 (-0.531)  3 [6] -0.036 (-0.100) 3 [10] -0.812 (-0.903)
   4 [4] 0.649 (0.496) 4 [10] -0.882 (-0.778)
   5 [2] -0.004 (-0.012) 5 [4] -0.157 (-0.408)
     6 [10] -1.229 (-1.566)
 
Notes: The numbers in brackets are the number of states. The corresponding t-statistic 
in the regression is constructed in the usual way by using HAC standard errors. At the 
5% level, the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected if the t-statistic < -1.65. All the 
t-statistics reported are higher than -1.65, indicating that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis at 5% in any case. 
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Table 3. States within clubs 
State Club (1956–1972) Club (1973–1998) Club (1956–1998) State Club (1956–1972) Club (1973–1998) Club (1956–1998) 
Alabama 3 3 3 Montana 2 4 3 
Alaska 4 3 3 Nebraska 1 1 3 
Arizona 5 6 3 Nevada 5  3 
Arkansas 4 6 3 New Hampshire 1 3 3 
California    New Jersey 1 2 1 
Colorado 4 6 3 New Mexico 2 3 3 
Connecticut 2 2 3 New York 1 2 1 
Delaware 2 4 3 North Carolina 1 5 2 
District of Columbia 1 5 3 North Dakota 1 2 1 
Florida 3 6 3 Ohio 2 3 3 
Georgia 2 6 3 Oklahoma 4 3 3 
Hawaii 2 6 3 Oregon 3 3 3 
Idaho 2 6 3 Pennsylvania 1 2 2 
Illinois 1 4 3 Rhode Island 2 1 2 
Indiana    South Carolina 1 4 2 
Iowa 1 2 3 South Dakota 1 3 2 
Kansas 1 4 3 Tennessee 2 6 3 
Kentucky 1 2 3 Texas 2 4 3 
Louisiana    Utah 1 4 1 
Maine 2 4 3 Vermont 1 4 2 
Maryland 1 3 3 Virginia 2 6 3 
Massachusetts 1 2 1 Washington 1 5 3 
Michigan 1 4 3 West Virginia 3 5 3 
Minnesota 1 2 3 Wisconsin 2 2 2 
Mississippi 3 3 3 Wyoming    
Missouri 3 6 3     
 
